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Abstract As a stress test of experimenter demand effects, we run an experiment where
subjects can physically destroy coupons awarded to them. About one subject out of
three does. Giving money back to the experimenter is possible in a separate task but
is more consistent with an experimenter demand effect than an explanation based on
altruism towards the experimenter. A measure of sensitivity to social pressure helps
predict destruction when social information is provided.
Keywords Altruism · Experimenter demand effects · Social information ·
Social pressure
JEL Classification B41 · C72 · C91 · D64
1 Introduction
This paper presents a stress test of experimenter demand effects, which refer to changes
in behaviour by experimental subjects due to cues about what constitutes an appropriate
behaviour (Zizzo 2010). The idea behind experimenter demand effects is that subjects
try to make sense of an unfamiliar experimental environment in order to decide an
appropriate response, and in doing so they may be particularly sensitive to whatever
cues are provided in such an environment. Our stress test of experimenter demand
effects is of particular relevance to the interpretation of results in settings, such as
public good games, trust games or bargaining games, that are characterized by variable
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surplus. That is, how the overall amount is split across the subjects depends on the
actions by the subjects.
We run an experiment where subjects can physically destroy money-equivalent
coupons awarded to them1 as well as, in a different task, explicitly return money
to the experimenter. Subjects affected by experimenter demand effects will con-
sider both tasks to be identical where, given their stylized nature and the absence
of any simple alternative schema to make sense of them, there is an expectation
that they should physically destroy or return some of the assets given to them. The
distinctive feature of the destruction task is that the coupons’ destruction could not
directly benefit the experimenter. This is in contrast to the cash return task or, indeed,
any experiment where a money transfer to the budget of the experimenter implic-
itly takes place if experimental surplus is destroyed or not obtained. In the cash
return task, unlike the destruction task, there can be a money transfer towards the
experimenter, so altruism towards the experimenter may potentially affect behaviour
and provide an alternative explanation of behaviour relative to experimenter demand
effects.
We are aware of two papers that have tested the possibility of altruism towards
the experimenter. In an insightful contribution, Frank (1998) did so in the con-
text of ultimatum games: in the experimental treatment, if the proposer’s offer was
rejected, the money-equivalent currency (stamps) was physically burned; they found
that receivers did not behave differently in this treatment relative to a control where
the money implicitly went back to the experimenter. However, the strategic nature
of ultimatum games may have meant that feelings of anger out of unfairness may
have reduced the relevance of altruism towards the experimenter in this context;
furthermore, this experiment did not control for the possibility that some subjects
would gain utility from seeing stamps physically burned in the laboratory. Harrison
and Johnson (2006) considered the effect of changing the recipients in standard dic-
tator games, and found that giving to the experimenter was intermediate between
giving to a charity and giving to another subject.2 This could be interpreted as evi-
dence of altruism towards the experimenter, but it is equally possible that returning
money to the experimenter by the implied transfer of unexploited experimental sur-
plus could in itself be due to experimenter demand, i.e. being due to the demands of
the experimental decision environment, rather than being due to altruism towards the
experimenter.3
1 We cannot use money directly because in the U.K. (as in many other countries) it is illegal to destroy
money. We later describe experimental checks for our claim that we can treat coupons as equivalent to
money in the experiments.
2 An interesting but unusual feature of their experiment is that, in their baseline, subjects were informed
that the experimenters had brought a certain amount of money to the experimental room.
3 [Harrison and Johnson (2006), footnote 1] are clear that they interpret altruism very broadly in their
paper, and are not looking to draw conclusions on the psychological motives underlying behaviour from
their experiment. Apart from experimenter demand effects, revealed altruism in dictator games may for
example be due to pro-social norms of giving (Guala and Mittone 2010). Below we simply speak of
altruism towards the experimenter, but ruling this out as an explanation will also rule out an interpretation
of our findings in terms of pro-social norms of giving.
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We use an extremely simple setup with minimal strategic concerns or potential for
misunderstanding to identify experimenter demand effects against alternative expla-
nations. By providing an equivalent physical task to all subjects regardless of whether
coupons are destroyed, we control for the pleasure of physical activity. Our experiment
also controls for the potential benefits of coupon destruction for the coupons provider
and for the clarity of the instructions. We are then able to separate out experimenter
demand effects from altruism towards the experimenter as possible explanations of
behaviour. If subjects are driven by altruism towards the experimenter in deciding
what to do in experiments with variable surplus tasks, we would expect subjects to
return money to the experimenter but not to destroy the coupons as this could not ben-
efit the experimenter. Conversely, if experimenter demand effects drive both physical
coupon destruction and returning money to the experimenter, both should be positive
and should be positively correlated to each other.
We have a social information treatment manipulation where we provide summary
information about how subjects behaved in a pilot. We also have a partial, albeit
imperfect, measure of sensitivity to social pressure by using the Stöber (2001) social
desirability scale.4 Intuitively, under social information the experimental norm (what is
expected of subjects in the experimental environment) should be clearer and, therefore,
subjects who are more responsive to social pressure should destroy more (conversely,
subjects who are resistant to social pressure may destroy less). This provides a further
stress test of experimenter demand effects.5
Section 2 presents the experimental design, Section 3 presents the results and Sec-
tion 4 briefly concludes. The experimental instructions are available in the appendix.
2 Experimental design
2.1 Design
64 participants completed the social desirability measure online. About one week later
participants were invited back to an experimental laboratory session. Participants com-
pleted two tasks in counterbalanced order followed by debriefing questions. Questions
to check understanding were given ahead of each task, and clarifications were given
to subjects who gave any incorrect question.
The two tasks were a (coupons) destruction task and a (cash) return task. In the
destruction task participants were given six 50 pence paper coupons worth £3 and six
paper blanks. The coupons were redeemable at university cafés.6 The participants were
4 An example of question on this scale ‘I always stay friendly and courteous with other people even when
I’m stressed out’ Stöber (2001).
5 Bischoff and Frank (2011) found only limited evidence for demand effects driven by the way the experi-
menter is dressed and reads the instructions; Zizzo and Fleming (2011) interpreted evidence from back-to-
back dictator and money reduction games in terms of sensitivity to social pressure. Zizzo (2010) contains
an overview of research related to experimenter demand effects.
6 We used coupons rather than stamps as in Frank (1998) because we felt that, with the universal diffusion
of mobile and IT forms of communications, particularly among the younger generations, many students
rarely make direct use of stamps nowadays (unlike, still, when Frank ran his experiment).
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told ‘you need to decide how many vouchers to destroy by shredding them’. For each
coupon not destroyed a paper blank was destroyed instead, using the same shredder,
so that the same physical activity took place for all participants, thus controlling for
any pleasure from the physical activity.7 Participants were discreetly observed during
this task. Participants kept any non-destroyed coupons for use after the experiment. In
the return task participants were given six 50 pence pieces worth £3. The participants
were told ‘you need to decide how much cash to return to the experimenters’ and
were provided with an envelope into which cash could be returned. Any remaining
cash and coupons could be kept as participant payment.8
There were two experimental treatments. In a NoInfo treatment (n = 31), there
were no further instructions. In the SocialInfo treatment (n = 33), subjects were told,
truthfully (as we relied on pilot data), the following social information: ‘In test ses-
sions… some people destroyed vouchers/returned cash - of those that did, on average
(rounded to the nearest 50p) they destroyed/returned £1 of vouchers/cash’.
After the decision tasks participants were asked about their perceived altruism in
voucher destruction, ‘Do you think destroying vouchers would be beneficial to [campus
cafés]?’ on a Likert scale from 1 not at all beneficial to 7 extremely beneficial. As a
further check, subjects were also asked about how clear they had found the instructions
for each of the two tasks, again on a 1–7 Likert scale.
3 Experimental results
Figure 1 presents histograms with amounts destroyed and returned. 30 % of partici-
pants in the NoInfo treatment and 35 % of participants in the SocialInfo treatment did
destroy some coupons. 6.6 and 11.1 % of endowments were, respectively, returned and
destroyed in the NoInfo treatment, vs. 9.7 and 11.8 % in the SocialInfo treatment. The
amounts destroyed and returned are comparable (Wilcoxon p = 0.392),9 implying
that altruism towards the experimenter (as separate from experimenter demand) is not
the primary driver of behaviour, for it cannot explain the destruction activity. While
there was more destruction or returning of coupons under SocialInfo, this does not
achieve statistical significance (Mann–Whitney p = 0.753 and 0.258 for destruction
and returning, respectively).
Table 1 presents a regression analysis on the amount destroyed. As destruction
can only take place in blocks of 50 pence (the value of each coupon), the amount
destroyed can take 7 levels, from 0 coupons destroyed to 6 coupons destroyed, and so
an ordered probit model is appropriate; Tobit estimates are also reproduced as robust-
ness checks. As independent variables we have CashReturned (the amount returned in
the return task) in two of the regressions, SocialInfo (= 1 in SocialInfo, else 0), SocDes
7 Physical destruction occurred by using shredders rather than burning the coupons in the light of U.K.
health and safety regulations.
8 Before leaving participants had the opportunity to sell their remaining vouchers using an incentivized
Becker et al. (1964) minimum selling price methodology if so they wished. Their average valuations for
the 50p coupons was 51 pence (SD = 18.49), confirming that the coupons were appropriately valued by
subjects.
9 All p values reported in this paper are two-sided.
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Fig. 1 Histograms of destruction and return choices in the NoInfo and SocialInfo treatments. a Destruction
task. b Return task percentages are rounded to the second decimal place
(the Stöber measure of social desirability),10 SocDesxSocialInfo (an interaction term),
Beneficial (stated extent to which the coupons destruction is seen as beneficial towards
the university café provider), ClearIDestruction (stated clarity of the destruction task
instructions), ClearIReturn (stated clarity of the return task instructions). There is a
clear and strong positive correlation between amount returned and amount destroyed,
10 This is centered about the mean to reduce multicollinearity when interacted (Marquardt 1980).
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which is consistent with an experimenter demand effect explanation rather than one
based on altruism towards the experiment. There is also a positive coefficient on
Beneficial, which is to be expected; however, the clarity of the instructions on destruc-
tion seems, if anything, to increase rather than decrease destruction,11 suggesting that
confusion was not a problem in our experiment.
SDS17xSocialInfo has a statistically significant positive coefficient. Subjects with
a higher value of SDS17 are more socially sensitive to social pressure, vertical—i.e.
experimenter demand—and horizontal—i.e. peer pressure. When social information
is provided, this provides greater clarity on the social demands of the situation and
subjects who are more sensitive to social pressure are then more responsive to destroy
more; though, as there is no average effect of social information, this clarity would also
seem to yield less destruction from subjects who are less sensitive to social pressure.
4 Conclusions
We considered a stress test of experimenter demand effects. Altruism towards the
experimenter is unable to explain the key finding of destruction of coupons by roughly
one subject out of three, the same as the fraction of subjects who returned money to
the experimenter. While the latter can be explained by altruism, the former cannot;
the strong positive correlation between coupons destroyed and money returned to the
experimenter is also left unexplained by an explanation based on altruism towards
the experimenter. Confusion is unlikely to be behind this as the tasks were simple,
subjects’ understanding was checked, and variables for clarity of the instructions on
the destruction task were either statistically non significant or positively rather than
negatively correlated with destruction. Subjects valued the coupons (see footnote 9)
and our analysis also controlled for the pleasure of physical destruction by ensuring
that the same physical destruction activity took place regardless of how many coupons
were destroyed; and for the possibility of benefiting the café coupon providers by
having a relevant question that went into our regression analysis.
Social information provided clarity on the experimental norm and, where present,
our measure of sensitivity to social pressure predicted the amount of destructive activ-
ity, which is consistent with experimenter demand effects. The heterogeneity in degrees
to which subjects are sensitive to social pressure is still largely a neglected variable in
economic research, and it should not be.
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11 In regression 2, the only one not achieving at least p < 0.1 significance, p = 0.106.
123
A simple stress test of experimenter demand effects
Ta
bl
e
1
R
eg
re
ss
io
ns
o
n
am
o
u
n
td
es
tro
ye
d
O
rd
er
ed
pr
o
bi
t
To
bi
t
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
M
ar
gi
na
le
ffe
ct
s
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Ca
sh
Re
tu
rn
ed
1.
38
9*
**
(0.
45
2)
0.
20
5*
**
(0.
06
7)
0.
90
2*
**
(0.
30
1)
So
ci
al
ln
fo
0.
00
5
(0.
34
6)
0.
13
0
(0.
34
0)
0.
00
1
(0.
05
1)
0.
02
6
(0.
06
7)
0.
03
5
(0.
32
0)
0.
16
3
(0.
37
5)
So
ci
al
D
es
−0
.1
08
(0
.0
82
)
−0
.1
25
(0
.0
83
)
−0
.0
16
(0
.0
13
)
−0
.0
25
(0
.1
67
)
−0
.0
92
(0
.0
75
)
−0
.1
22
(0
.0
88
)
So
ci
al
D
es
×s
o
ci
al
In
fo
0.
25
3*
*
(0.
12
1)
0.
27
0*
*
(0.
11
7)
0.
03
7*
*
(0.
01
9)
0.
05
3*
*
(0.
02
4)
0.
18
9*
(0.
10
8)
0.
26
8*
*
(0.
12
6)
B
en
efi
ci
al
0.
20
2*
*
(0.
10
3)
0.
21
2*
*
(0.
10
1)
0.
29
9*
(0.
16
4)
0.
04
2*
*
(0.
02
1)
0.
17
9*
(0.
09
5)
0.
21
4*
(0.
11
2)
Cl
ea
rID
es
tru
ct
io
n
0.
41
6*
*
(0.
19
8)
0.
29
9
(0.
18
5)
0.
06
1*
*
(0.
03
1)
0.
05
9
(0.
03
7)
0.
30
2*
*
(0.
17
4)
0.
28
9
(0.
20
1)
Cl
ea
rIR
et
ur
n
−0
.2
59
(0
.1
85
)
−0
.1
88
(0
.1
87
)
−0
.0
38
(0
.0
28
)
−0
.0
37
(0
.0
37
)
−0
.1
87
( 0
.1
63
)
−0
.1
51
(0
.1
92
)
Co
ns
ta
nt
−1
.8
43
(1
.0
30
)
−2
.0
70
(1
.2
86
)
Lo
g
lik
el
ih
oo
d
−5
0.
35
1
−5
6.
52
9
−4
9.
49
5
−5
3.
83
6
n
=
63
fo
ra
ll
re
gr
es
sio
ns
(on
es
u
bje
ct
fa
ile
d
to
an
sw
er
th
e
qu
es
tio
ns
o
n
th
e
cl
ar
ity
o
fi
ns
tru
ct
io
ns
).T
he
re
po
rte
d
m
ar
gi
na
le
ffe
ct
sm
ea
su
re
ho
w
a
m
ar
gi
na
li
nc
re
as
e
in
ea
ch
in
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
ei
n
th
eo
rd
er
ed
pr
ob
it
re
gr
es
sio
ns
1
an
d
2
in
cr
ea
se
th
ep
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
o
ft
he
hi
gh
es
ta
m
o
u
n
tb
ei
ng
de
st
ro
ye
d
(i.
e.
1.
5
co
u
po
ns
,a
s
sh
o
w
n
by
Fi
g.
1a
).S
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
*
*
*
p
<
0.
01
,*
*
p
<
0.
05
,*
p
<
0.
1
123
P. Fleming, D. J. Zizzo
Appendix
Sessions vary according to:
• Order 0 vs Order 1
• NoInfo vs SocialInfo [no information vs social information]
Experimental instructions
Thank you for taking part in this experiment on decision making. Please raise your
hand if you have any questions at any point in the experiment. Please do not touch any
of the items in front of you unless told otherwise.
There are three stages in this experiment; all of your decisions are confidential.
Your decisions will be anonymized for analysis. Your decisions alone will determine
your earnings.
You will receive £2 for attending this experiment.
[Order 0]
In stage 1 you will be given £3 worth of vouchers which can be spent in Blend/Zest/Cafe
Direct any time this month. You will then decide how much to keep. You can choose
to keep all £3.
In stage 2 you will be given £3 in coins. You will then decide how much to keep.
You can choose to keep all £3.
Before you leave you will answer some questions.
You will be given the money in advance of completing the experiment so we will
now ask you to sign that you have received the cash and vouchers. Please empty the
two brown envelopes in front of you (named ‘Vouchers’ and ‘Cash’) and count their
contents.
Please raise your hand when you are ready to continue.
These questions are only to make sure that you have understood the instructions.
Please raise your hand when you have completed them.
1. What is the maximum value of vouchers and money you can choose to leave this
experiment with? ______
2. What is the minimum value of vouchers and money you can choose to leave this
experiment with? ______
3. Will all of your earnings be in cash? Yes / No
Voucher decision [Order 0: Stage 1]
In the voucher envelope you have been given £3 worth of vouchers which can be spent
in Blend/Zest/Cafe Direct on campus this month. There are also an equivalent number
of worthless pieces of paper (which you will not keep).
123
A simple stress test of experimenter demand effects
In a moment you will be asked to destroy six of these items (these vouchers or the
worthless paper equivalents). We would like you to practice this in a moment.
Please do not destroy anything right away but raise your hand and wait for
the experimenter to tell you to proceed.
Practice
In front of the shredder is a blank piece of paper approximately of the same size as a
voucher. Please carefully use the shredder to destroy it.
Decision
You have one decision to make in this stage. Namely, you need to decide how many
vouchers to destroy by shredding them.
You must shred six items. If you decide not to destroy a voucher in the shredder
you are asked to destroy a piece of blank paper instead. You keep any vouchers you
do not destroy.
[Treatment SocialInfo only:
In test sessions of this experiment which we ran in May some people destroyed vouch-
ers - of those that did, on average (rounded to the nearest 50p) they destroyed £1 of
vouchers.]
Please now do the following in sequence:
1. Shred six items.
2. Place any of the unshredded blank paper slips back in the envelope.
3. Turn over the page.
Please write down the value of vouchers that you have destroyed (£0–£3): £_________
Please raise your hand to let the experimenter know when you are ready to proceed.
Cash decision [Order 0: Stage 2]
In the cash envelope you have been given £3.
You have one decision to make in this stage. Namely, you need to decide how much
cash to return to the experimenters. You keep any cash you do not return.
Please now do the following in sequence:
1) Place any cash that you wish to return in the envelope back in the envelope.
2) Turn over the page.
[Treatment SocialInfo only:
In test sessions of this experiment which we ran in May some people returned cash—of
those that did, on average (rounded to the nearest 50p) they returned £1 of cash.]
Please write down the amount of cash you put in the envelope (£0–£3):
£ ____________
Please raise your hand to let the experimenter know when you are ready to proceed.
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Order 1: 
Same instructions as above but with two changes relative to Order 0: (a) Stage 1 of Order 0 becomes 
stage 2 and Stage 2 of Order 0 becomes Stage 1; (b) corresponding small changes in text. 
Final Questions [common for Order 0 and Order 1]
Regarding the decision about vouchers – why did you make the decision you made?
Regarding the decision about cash – why did you make the decision you made?
Do you believe that any shredded vouchers are destroyed and made worthless? Yes / No
Do you think destroying vouchers would be beneficial to Blend/Zest/Cafe Direct? 
not at all 
beneficial
extremely 
beneficial
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
How clear were the instructions for the decision about vouchers? 
not at all 
clear
extremely 
clear
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Is there anything you did not understand for the decision about vouchers?
How clear were the instructions for the decision about cash? 
not at all 
clear
extremely 
clear
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Is there anything you did not understand for the decision about cash?
Did you feel under any pressure or expectation to destroy the vouchers? 
Not at all Very much 
so
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Did you feel under any pressure or expectation to return the cash?
Not at all Very much 
so
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please make sure that you answered all questions. Then raise your hand to indicate that you are ready 
to proceed.
Minimum selling price
We will now give you the opportunity to sell your remaining vouchers (six minus the
number you destroyed before). We will be willing to pay a random amount X between
1p and 100p for each voucher. You must decide how much you are willing to accept
for your vouchers.
If your stated willingness to accept is smaller or equal to the randomly drawn price
X, then we will purchase all your remaining vouchers for the randomly drawn price
X - not for your stated willingness to accept. You receive the price X for each remaining
voucher.
If your stated minimum selling price per voucher is greater than the randomly
drawn price X, then we will not purchase any vouchers from you. You keep all of your
remaining vouchers.
Example Imagine that you have 4 remaining vouchers and stated a minimum selling
price of 61 pence per voucher. If the randomly drawn price X were, say, 64 pence, we
would buy all your vouchers at a price of 64 pence - not 61 pence. Thus you would get
paid 4 * 64p = £2.56. If the randomly drawn price X were, say, 53 pence, we would
not buy the vouchers from you and you would leave with your vouchers. Because your
answer does not affect the amount you get paid, only whether you sell, it is to your
advantage to state the minimum that you would be willing to be paid for selling each
of your vouchers.
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What would be the lowest price at which you were willing to sell each of your remaining 50p 
vouchers (for use in Blend/Zest/Cafe Direct)?  
My minimum selling price is _________ pence per voucher. 
After writing down your minimum selling price please raise your hand to indicate that you are ready 
to proceed. 
To be completed by the experimenter: 
Random number drawn: _________ 
Sell all remaining vouchers for price 
Number of remaining vouchers: _________ 
Price : _________ 
Total payment for vouchers: _________ 
Leave with all remaining vouchers – no payment 
Session: _________ 
Participant: _________ 
Demographic Questions 
  
Age: ____ 
 
Gender:  Female___  Male____ 
 
Nationality: _________________ 
 
Study level:  Undergraduate___  Postgraduate____ 
 
Do you study or did you study economics as a main university subject? (That is, with economics in 
the degree title, e.g. BA Banking and Economics)? 
Yes___    No____ 
123
A simple stress test of experimenter demand effects
Finally, please put this sheet and both brown envelopes (‘Vouchers’ and ‘Cash’)
into the large white envelope provided and give them to the experimenter when you
leave. Please close but do not seal any of the envelopes.
Please do not discuss this experiment until we have finished testing (the end of
this week). Thank you for taking part. If you wish to know more about this experi-
ment, please email Dr. Piers Fleming (p.fleming@uea.ac.uk) and you will be put on a
debriefing list. A debriefing note on the experiment will then be emailed to you after
all experimental sessions have been run.
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